FDI in the New European Neighbours of Southern Europe: a quest of institutions-based attractiveness by Fabry, Nathalie & Zeghni, Sylvain
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
FDI in the New European Neighbours of
Southern Europe: a quest of
institutions-based attractiveness
Nathalie Fabry and Sylvain Zeghni
Universite´ de Marne-la-Valle´e
April 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1109/
MPRA Paper No. 1109, posted 10. December 2006
 1 
FDI in the New European Neighbours of Southern 
Europe: a quest of institutions-based attractiveness 
 
Nathalie FABRY
1
 and Sylvain ZEGHNI
2
 
 
 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the transition process, initial conditions were critical and 
the need of deep and sustained reforms was important to recover a dynamic 
growth path (World Bank, 2002). If some Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) integrated recently the EU after more than 10 years of 
transition3, South Eastern European Countries (SEECs) have to continue to set 
up deep reforms and institution building to reach this aim4. They are 
latecomers for four main reasons. First, the collapse of communism created 
windows of opportunities for ethnical and religious communities. The splitting 
of the Yugoslav Republic into Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia & Montenegro was a 
                                                     
1 Associate Professor (Ph.D.), University of Marne-la-Vallée (France) - E-mail : 
nathalie.fabry@univ-mlv.fr  
2 Associate Professor (Ph.D.), University of Marne-la-Vallée (France) - E-mail : 
sylvain.zeghni@univ-mlv.fr 
3 In May 2004 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia became EU members.  
4 The SEECs countries are: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia & 
Montenegro (Broadman & al., 2004). McGee (2003) adopts a more open definition of 
SEECs and adds Greece, Slovenia, and Turkey. We exclude Greece and Slovenia 
because they are still EU members and Turkey because it is not a former communist 
country. Among SEECs, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania and the FYR of Macedonia 
(since December 2005) are still candidate countries. 
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consequence of internal conflicts and civil wars (Broadman and al., 2004). 
These ‘new’ but heterogeneous micro countries may not be naturally attractive 
for FDI. They lack of intra-regional integration and have small market sizes. 
Second, the SEECs have to set up major reforms, to help institutions to support 
the market economy and to facilitate the development of the private sphere on 
an internationally competitive base. The task is difficult because of the high 
rate of poverty and the war disasters that damaged the political stability, the 
infrastructure reliabilities and contributed to the disintegration of the industrial 
structures. Moreover, in these countries, the informal institutions linked to the 
historical and ethnical roots, combined with the communist legacy, play a 
major role in defining specific social rules and habits. Third, for the most 
advanced of them, SEECs have to fulfil the three main Copenhagen criteria 
before accession. The political criterion focuses on the stability of institutions, 
the level of democracy, the rule of law, the human rights and the respect for 
and protection of minorities. The economic criterion deals with the existence 
of an efficient market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union. At last, the 
Acquis Communautaire criterion reflects the ability to take on the obligations 
of membership including adherence to the aims of the Political, Economic and 
Monetary Union. Finally, SEECs are at the periphery of the EU in a 
geographical point of view but also in an economic and social one.  
The post-communist countries have also to deal with the challenge of 
globalization. All countries, whatever their development level and historical 
background, have to host inward-FDI to stay competitive. In the specific case 
of transitional countries, FDI may help to retool industry, to achieve 
modernization, industrial upgrading and improve productivity by importing 
foreign technologies, diffusing knowledge and western best practices. They 
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also may help to develop international trade (Fabry & Zeghni 2003a; Paas, 
2003; Zakharov & Kušić 2003).  
The war in Former Yugoslavia had a serious negative impact on the local 
economic landscape and on the foreign investors’ perception of risks (East 
West Institute, 2000). Among countries not devastated by ethnical conflicts, 
the level of the corruption, the lack of entrepreneurship mood and capabilities, 
the weaknesses of the industrial structures, and the uncertain perspective of the 
EU accession deter inward-FDI. The lack of market-oriented institutions and 
the presence of deeply rooted informal institutions such as black markets seem 
us to be of a major concern. As shown by World Bank (2002) and Broadman 
and al. (2004), the SEECs decided to protect former state owned enterprises by 
giving subsidies granted through the budget and local banks. Local 
entrepreneurship and foreign investors are disappointed by the weak public and 
corporate governance and the asset-stripping (Dallago, 2005). High tax rates, 
abuse in licensing and registration procedures, weak legal and judicial system 
discourage inward-FDI (OECD, 2001). Corruption starts to become a serious 
obstacle to the growth of new enterprises (Gray, Hellman & Ryterman, 2004)5.  
The SEECs are not among the countries that receive the more inward-FDI at 
the present time and they receive less inward-FDI than the CEECs on the 
                                                     
5 Nevertheless, in the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, the Investment Compact 
is a very interesting initiative. The SEECs have adopted a joined procedure to 
encourage FDI. This initiative tends to permit a quasi-uniform procedure to host FDI 
and to improve transparency. With the Investment Compact, the SEECs works together 
for unifying FDI registration and approval procedures with those for domestic firms, 
allowing acquisition of real estate by foreign investors for FDI purposes, minimizing 
FDI-related requirements on statistical reporting, work and residence permits, 
eliminating discrimination in access to government procurement contracts and 
removing obstacles to FDI in financial and professional services. (OECD, 2005) 
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period 1998 – 20036. Nevertheless, several major features can be put in 
evidence: the political instability, the weak infrastructures and a lack of 
perspective to become EU Member (Hunya, 2002; Botrić & Škuflić, 2005).  
As shortly described, the actual institutional context is a barrier to 
attractiveness and development while the restoration of sustained growth and 
poverty reduction are key priority for SEECs7. The main question we set in this 
paper is whether or not the weak inward-FDI are linked to non reliable 
institutions and to a non EU membership. The aim of the paper is to 
understand the role of institutions in shaping a strong localization advantage 
for FDI. The quest of reliable and safe institutions has recently emerged in the 
economic literature, first as a catalyst for growth (Bardhan, 2005; Gwartney. 
Holcombe & Lawson, 2004; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003; Edison, 2003) and 
more recently as an inward-FDI attractor mainly in transition economies 
(Pournarakis & Varsakelis, 2004; Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004). Contrary to 
the New Institutional School, we argue that institutions are not pre-conditions 
to host FDI. In the transition context, institutions are the result of an interaction 
between host country and foreign investors. That is what we call institutions-
based attractiveness.  
                                                     
6 The FDI inflows to SEECs have increased from 408 millions $ in 1993 to 6.7 billions 
in 2003. In 1993, FDI Inflows to SEECs represented 8% of the total FDI in the CEECs, 
in 2002 it represented 20% and in 2003 60%. This trend is explained by the fact that in 
transition countries, FDI are strongly related to privatizations. As the UNCTAD (2005) 
shows, the decline of FDI in the CEECs is strongly linked to the decline of 
privatizations. The Greenfield FDI in the CEECs are not strong enough to compensate 
the FDI-led privatization. On the Contrary, in the SEECs after a long period of statu 
quo, a large movement of privatization is starting that encourages FDI. 
7 “By 2001, the region had reached only 74 percent of its pre-transition (1989) level of 
economic activity. In comparison, the five most developed Central European transition 
economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) 
had increased their combined output to 115 percent of 1989 levels.” Page XXI 
(Broadman and al. 2004). 
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This paper is structured as follows: in section I we develop a theoretical 
framework to understand the relationship between Transition, Institutions and 
inward-FDI and present a set of hypothesis. In section II we develop our 
empirical analysis and methodology. Finally, we conclude on the relevance of 
our results. We will focus on the formal institutions mainly market supporting 
ones and will not deal with informal institutions which are in these countries of 
a very high importance. Our choice is due to the difficulty to quantify the 
influence of informal institutions.  
 
 
I. A theoretical framework of institutions as FDI 
determinants 
The question we address in this section is: What does theory tell us about FDI 
determinants in general and in what extend do institutions matter to attract FDI 
particularly in transitional countries? 
 
1. FDI determinants: an emphasis on the localization advantage 
The theory of FDI determinants may be resumed by Dunning’s OLI 
framework (1993). To invest abroad, a firm needs to gather simultaneously 
three advantages: an Ownership advantage that may be seen as one or more 
intangible assets of the firm over its competitors; a Localization advantage 
which is located in the host country and attracts the foreign investors; and an 
Internalisation advantage that gives the firm an opportunity to avoid pure 
market transactions. Among these three advantages, the Localization 
advantage gains increasingly in importance since the global era. This 
advantage is first based on natural assets and may reflect three major MNE’s 
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strategies: supply-oriented or resources seeking, demand-oriented or market-
seeking, efficiency-seeking or global. 
A supply-oriented strategy is devoted to costs optimization and, generally, 
generates vertical FDI. Firms seek to benefit from the productivity and quality 
of the production factors mainly labour (cost of unskilled labour, pool of 
skilled labour), the quality and reliance of physical infrastructures 
(telecommunication, ports, airports, and roads), the raw material endowments, 
the quality of social and political environment, and the level of technology 
(Dunning 1993; Demekas & al. 2005). Whit a demand-oriented strategy firms 
seek to benefit from enlarged market shares and generates horizontal FDI. The 
growth of demand, the market size, the consumer preferences, the per capita 
income, and the access to regional markets are important FDI determinants. 
The efficiency-seeking aims to create new sources of competitiveness which 
combines supply and demand oriented strategies linked to market access and 
production costs optimization. The regulatory environment, the 
macroeconomic stability, the ability to repatriate profit (if any) and even the 
presence of local or foreign competitors may also influence inward-FDI. 
FDI determinants are heterogeneous and closely connected to the firm’s 
decision to enter in vertical and/or horizontal FDI. We want to emphasize a 
point that is scarcely analyzed in papers: whatever the strategy adopted by a 
MNE, generic FDI determinants exist and deal with the easiness of doing 
business in a host country. Such determinants depend less from natural assets 
than from created assets. (Botrić and Škuflić, 2005) 
In the economic literature, created assets as basement of the Localization 
advantage were developed by authors focusing on the spillovers effects and 
the networking impact of FDI agglomeration (Barell & Pain, 1999; Campos & 
Kinoshita 2003). In transitional countries, FDI clusters and networking may be 
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explained more by the lack of local infrastructures, by the weakness of the 
local subcontractors and even by unfavourable business environment than by 
positive externalities. This points out, that institutions are a strong part of the 
Localization advantage by regulating the markets and also delivering efficient 
public services. This idea has been recently developed in the empirical 
literature (Bevan & al., 2004; Narula & Dunning, 2000; Pournarakis & 
Varsakelis, 2004; Sehti & al. 2002) but we need to know more formally which 
institutions are relevant to attract foreign investors. 
 
Figure 1: The FDI determinants 
3 pillars of FDI determinants
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2. The institutional pattern 
According to North (1990), institutions are important and endogenous 
elements of a country’s economic growth. A good institutional pattern should 
be composed of a panel of formal institutions such as the rule of law driven by 
the State (McGee, 2004) and informal institutions based on social conventions 
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that are determined by the historical, cultural and sociological context of each 
country. The functional typology of formal Institutions proposed by Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2003), helps us to specify what a good market oriented 
institutional pattern could be. 
The Market creating institutions represent the rules of law that protect property 
rights and make contracts fair and reliable for all actors. Such formal 
institutions based on a clear legislation and on an efficient and fair judicial 
system create incentives for investment and private sector development. The 
three next institutions contribute to the emergence of a social consensus about 
risks, burden and prosperity sharing in a context of a market-oriented 
economy. The Market regulating institutions help to regulate market 
externalities, imperfect and asymmetric information or scales economies in 
sectors like transportation, telecommunication or environment. The Market 
stabilizing institutions reduce macroeconomic instabilities (inflation, currency 
rate, balanced budget, fiscal rules) and prevent major political crisis. Finally, 
the Market legitimizing institutions support social protection and manage 
social conflicts. It can be an insurance system or a welfare system that protects 
a minima people from a social dropping out.  
The institutional pattern is an important part of the host country’s localization 
advantage. Stable, flexible and adaptable institutions contribute to build an 
endogenous attractiveness. Our purpose now is to give more content to the link 
“Institutions and FDI determinants” by developing the concept of institution-
based attractiveness.  
 
3. The institution-based attractiveness 
Transition created an ‘institutional vacuum’ (Grogan and Moers, 2001: 327). 
Regarding the institutional pattern, two categories of institutions could be 
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observed: the Greenfield Institutions and the Brownfield ones. Greenfield 
Institutions did not exist under the communist era and needed to be created and 
introduced while Brownfield Institutions needed to be adapted and reshaped to 
fit the market economy. Local reluctances could appear among individuals 
unwilling to get rid of their former but outdated practices and/or unable to 
adopt new practices. Because institutions are a local combination of social 
conventions and rules, historical background, cultural and geographical 
characteristics (Fabry & Zeghni, 2006), we may legitimately wonder whether 
or not institutions are prerequisite for FDI. In what extend could FDI 
contribute to accelerate the Institutional changes and be Institutions builders 
(Hewko 2002)?  
The neo-institutional theoretical framework asserts that safe and reliable 
institutions are prerequisites for inward-FDI (Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Gray & 
Jarosz, 1995; Salacuse, 2000; Seidman, Seidman & Walde, 1999). We stress 
that in the transition context, institutions may not be considered as 
preconditions to FDI because they are not efficient enough to be effective. 
Besides, the institutional pattern should be adapted to social needs and, as 
Hewko (2002) mentioned, FDI may be ‘institutions builder’ by suggesting 
institutional adaptations and by transferring some best practices. Host countries 
and foreign investors interact in the transition context to build progressively a 
suitable institutional arrangement. That is the reason why we introduce the 
concept of institution-based attractiveness. 
We call attractiveness the host country’s struggle to attract inward-FDI. 
Attractiveness is a result but also a dynamic process, which reflects both the 
ability of the host country to build and manage its attractiveness and the 
multinational firms involvement in that country. This involvement is mainly 
due to real business opportunities and the foreign investors’ perception of the 
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host country business environment (risk aversion). In short the foreign 
investor’s involvement depends on the local opportunities and on the easiness 
of doing business locally. 
 
Figure 2: The host country institution-based attractiveness 
few efficiency
Transition = institutional vacuum
Brownfield institutions
=
Institutional reshaping
Greenfield institutions
=
Institutional building
Local institutional arrangement  =
easiness to do business locally + business opportunities
Foreign firms =  Institution builders via  transfer of best practices and experiences - lobbying - regional integration development (via exports) ....
Rule of Law: Strong and clear definit ion of property rights -
Commercial law - Enforcement of contracts - Efficient  and fair
judicial system - Degree of corruption …
Regulation: Fair competit ion (access to land & construction
permit) - Distortions minimizing - Privatisat ion - Deregulation
Macroeconomic stability & predictable  policy environment:
Low inflat ion rate - Stability of currency - Balanced budget  &
financial discipline - Fiscal rules & tax burden - T rade policy -
Banking system (foreign exchange accounts - currency
exchange)…
Socio-economic conditions: Insurance system - Welfare system
- Education level and at t itude of the local work force - Physical
infrastructures - Business culture (accounting framework)…
Political risk: Polit ical stability - Government stability -
Improving public administration & quality of local bureaucracy
Market: Proximity to relevant markets - Market  size - Intra
regional t rade
Culture & mentalities: Nationalism (acceptance to sell
nat ional assets to foreigners) - Religious tensions - Ethnic
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The institution-based attractiveness reflects the institution set that a country 
may develop at a certain period in order to attract FDI. As Rodrik (2004) 
argues, different stages of economic development imply different “institutional 
arrangements”. A catching up process may involve some originality in an 
institutional pattern. Foreign investors’ involvement in a country depends on 
the convergence of their business expectations and local institutional 
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arrangements. For example, contrary to Russia, a non conventional set of 
institutions in China has not discouraged inward-FDI (Fabry and Zeghni, 
2003b). 
The better the institutional arrangement in a host country, the higher inward-
FDI we get. Such institutional arrangement relies essentially on the four 
categories of formal market institutions developed by Rodrik & Subramanian 
(2003). We can easily suppose that a transition country with a complete set of 
market institutions will host more FDI per capita than another country less 
endowed with institutions ceteris paribus. But a complete set may not be easily 
gathered over a short period in a transitional country characterized by 
institutional uncertainty. Our quest is first to separate each type of formal 
institution as FDI determinant and our second task is to find out which kind of 
institutional arrangement may have a positive impact on inward-FDI. The 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1 Countries with strong market creating institutions receive more FDI per capita 
H2 Countries with strong market regulating institutions receive more FDI per capita 
H3 Countries with strong market stabilizing institutions receive more FDI per capita 
H4 Countries with strong market legitimizing institutions receive more FDI per capita 
H5 Countries with stable and transparent government system receive more FDI per capita 
H6 The local institutional arrangement of each country is composed of a set of market 
creating institution, market regulating institutions, market stabilizing institutions and 
market legitimizing institutions. Countries with strong local institutional arrangement 
receive more FDI per capita 
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II. An empirical analysis of institution-driven FDI 
We test the hypothesis stated in the previous section and seek to explain 
inward-FDI variations among host countries. The question we address in this 
part is: Do institutions explain the inward FDI pattern in SEECs? 
 
1. Methodology 
We distinguish two categories of host countries: the candidates to a EU 
membership (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) that may have more efficient 
institutions thanks to the close fulfilment of the Acquis communautaire 
criterion and the convergence towards EU best practices, and the non 
candidate countries or too recent candidate country8 (Albania, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia & Montenegro and TFYR Macedonia).  
The complete panel including both categories is made of eight countries. The 
period concerned by our empirical analysis is 1992-2004. Traditionally, 
authors use cross sectional analysis (Grogan & Moers, 2001; Pournarakis & 
Varsakelis, 2004) or bilateral ones between home and host countries (Bevan 
and al., 2004) but few use pooled regression which combine time series and 
cross sectional data (Demekas & al. 2005). In the present empirical analysis, 
we use pooled regression which we consider as a relevant methodology for 
heterogeneous data and a short time series. 
Our empirical model is built for each year (from 1992 to 2004) and for each 
host country. The specification of the model is as follows: 
Log FDIPC = c0 + ά1 log GDPPC + ά2 COMPET + ά3 CPI  ά4 EHE + ά5 ER 
+ ά6 GOV 
 
                                                     
8 TFYR of Macedonia is candidate since December 2005. 
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The explained variable FDIPC is the inward foreign direct investment per 
capita for each year t in each host country c expressed in million of USD 
according to the balance of payment data. Per capita figures allow us to stress 
on the relative size of the host country.  
Among the independent variables, GDPPC represent the real growth rate of 
GDP per capita for each year t in each host country c. It should be a proxy for 
market growth and local market potential (Chakrabarti, 2001) and will be used 
as a control variable to capture the demand’s attraction effect on FDI which is 
robust according to the literature. Hence, the expected sign should be positive. 
Because of the small size of our sample we cannot introduce more than one 
control variable. We have chosen five other independent variables which 
emphasize the institutional environment effects i.e. the stage of transformation 
and the institutional context. 
The variable COMPET is for country c and year t the EBRD index of 
competition policy. COMPET should measure the progress in the reform of 
competition policy. This is an evaluation of privatization in a quantitative 
perspective (share of private enterprise) but also in a qualitative one (efficiency 
of privatization method, the result of a privatized enterprise, and the share of 
foreign investor in capital). C varies from 1 (low) to 4+ (excellent). The 
expected sign should be positive because C reflects the efficiency of the 
privatization process (hypothesis H2). 
The variable CPI is for country c and year t the Transparency International 
corruption perception index. CPI should measure the level of the institutions 
stabilization and the corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived among public 
officials and politicians. This composite index reflects the views of 
businessmen and country risk analysts from around the world, including 
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experts who are locals in the countries evaluated. This index varies from 1 
(high corruption) to 10 (no corruption). The expected sign should be positive 
because CPI reflects the reduction of opacity in business rules (hypothesis H3). 
The variable EHE is for country c and year t the Expenditure on health and 
education as a percentage of GDP. These expenditures are those from general 
government, excluding those by state-owned enterprises. The expected sign 
should be positive because EHE reflects the improvements of the local social 
and human capital (hypothesis H4) that prevent a minima people from a social 
dropping out and contestation. 
The variable ER represents the EBRD index of enterprise reform for each 
country c and year t. To capture progress in enterprise reform, EBRD retains, 
for its evaluation, criteria such as the reduction of budgetary subsidies to firms, 
the improvement of tax collection, the share of industry in total employment 
and the change in labour productivity. ER varies from 1 (no progress) to 4+ 
(excellent near standard of advanced economies) and stresses on the 
relationship between inward FDI in a country and the evolution of the local 
business environment. The expected sign should be positive because inward-
FDI should be sensitive to the increase of the global efficiency of the 
economies (hypothesis H1). 
The variable GOV is for country c and year t the Freedom House index. GOV 
is a proxy of the stability of the governmental system, and of the legislative 
and executive transparency. GOV synthesizes the ability of the legislative 
power to make law and its investigative responsibilities but also to install more 
decentralization of power and promote local government bodies (Hypothesis 
5). GOV varies from 7 (the lowest level) to 1 (the best level). The rating 
follows a quarter-point scale. Minor to moderate developments typically 
warrant a positive or negative change of a quarter (0.25) to a half (0.50) point. 
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Significant developments typically warrant a positive or negative change of 
three-quarters (0.75) to a full (1.00) point. It is rare that the rating in any 
category will fluctuate by more than a full point (1.00) in a single year. 
 
Figure 3: The model tested 
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All these five variables are proxies of the perceived quality of the institutions. 
These measures are subjective but close to the actor’s perceptions of the local 
business environment climate. Figure 3 gives an overview of our empirical 
model. 
 
2. Results of the empirical analyses 
The statistical model is based on a panel data mixing temporal and country 
indications (pooling). The equations are tested through the generalized least 
square (GLS) method to avoid heteroscedasticity. For all the equations tested, 
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adjusted R2 and the F-test results have acceptable values, the control variable 
has the expected sign (+) and is statistically significant showing us that 
demand (GDPPC) remains a significant inward-FDI determinant. The sign of 
the intercept is negative and significant for all equations (except for eq.6), 
informing us that, if all independent variable where null, FDI would decrease. 
For each countries panel, all independent variables are included in equation 
(1), in equation (2) to (6) we introduced each different type of formal 
institution separately. We will focus our commentaries on some characteristic 
features.  
Table1 concerns the complete pool composed of the eight host countries. The 
intercept signs are negative, except for Equation (6) and are significant. GOV 
and COMPET have the expected signs but are not significant in Equation (1) 
and are significant respectively in Equation (2) and (6). At the general 
institutional arrangement level (Eq.1), these two variables are no really 
relevant for FDI even if they have a relative importance at an individual level. 
EHE has a negative sign and is significant (in Equation 1 and 4) telling us that 
inward-FDI decrease when education and health expenses increase. It may 
suggest that FDI are cost-seeking oriented and do not need qualified labour. 
ER and CPI are significant variable. At this stage in the transition process, the 
reform of enterprise and the fight against corruption are very important in 
giving some confidence to foreign investors. Hence, non stable and transparent 
business environment deter inward-FDI and border them on market-seeking 
and cost-reducing strategies adapted to capture the various business 
opportunities. Nevertheless, the panel is composed of heterogeneous countries 
and need to be divided into future accession countries and non accession 
countries.  
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Table 1: GLS estimations for the Complete Pool  
Complete Poll (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia 
& Montenegro and TFYR Macedonia) – 95 Observations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -2.731845 
(0.0460)** 
-3.860477 
(0.0000)*** 
-2.528736 
(0.0006)*** 
-1.630328 
(0.0461)*
* 
-3.356638 
(0.0000)*
** 
2.353205 
(0.0264)** 
Log GDPpc 0.516858 
(0.0000)*** 
0.745293 
(0.0000)*** 
0.503614 
(0.0000)*** 
0.916391 
(0.0000)*
** 
0.516293 
(0.0000)*
** 
0.656592 
(0.0000)*** 
COMPET 0.055160 
(0.8051) 
1.168833 
(0.0000)*** 
    
CPI 0.488786 
(0.0019)*** 
 1.002749 
(0.0000)*** 
   
EHE -0.120285 
(0.0001)*** 
  -0.159984 
(0.0000)*
** 
  
ER 1.135499 
(0.0003)*** 
   1.579525 
(0.0000)*
** 
 
GOV 0.017093 
(0.9100) 
    -0.743828 
(0.0000)*** 
Adjusted R² 0.807286 0.652991 0.844399 0.856403 0.592798 0.685358 
F-Value 66.62808 
(0.000000) 
89.44319 
(0.000000) 
256.0541 
(0.000000) 
281.3040 
(0.000000
) 
69.42194 
(0.000000
) 
103.3763 
(0.000000) 
Method GLS Weighted 
Probability are in bracket - P statistically significant at 1% :(***); at 5% (**) ; at 10%  (*)* 
 
Table 2 deals with the accession pool composed of Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania. For all equations, the intercept has a negative sign and is significant. 
Nevertheless intercept has a relatively high value in Equation (1) to (4) that 
limits the signification of our results. Local Demand is a strong FDI 
determinant except in Equation (5) where this variable is non significant. 
COMPET becomes a relevant determinant for inward-FDI. Like in the general 
panel EHE is significant but has a negative sign suggesting that FDI are 
privatization-led. CPI stays an important problem for foreign investor. 
Moreover; GOV as a single determinant is significant and have the expected 
sign but in Equation (1) become non pertinent. In accession countries, 
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Institutional pattern is more transparent and FDI may be more sensitive to the 
local competition environment that reflects the development of the private 
sector. 
 
Table 2: GLS estimations for the Accession Pool  
Accession Pool : Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania – 39 Observations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -8.367302 
(0.0071)*** 
-9.289493 
(0.0000)*** 
-7.598856 
(0.0000)*** 
-10.88518 
(0.0000)*
** 
-4.814962 
(0.0098)*
** 
-1.720163 
(0.3283) 
Log GDP 0.77643 
(0.0014)*** 
1.405297 
(0.0000)*** 
1.041299 
(0.0000)*** 
2.126428 
(0.0000)*
** 
0.252341 
(0.4209) 
1.266143 
(0.0000)*** 
COMPET 0.600869 
(0.0586)* 
1.306952 
(0.0000)*** 
    
CPI 0.500840 
(0.0239)** 
 1.247321 
(0.0000)*** 
   
EHE -0.115253 
(0.0301)** 
  -0.156761 
(0.0000)*
** 
  
ER 1.813672 
(0.0002)*** 
   3.071452 
(0.0000)*
** 
 
GOV 0.186616 
(0.5695) 
    -0.878244 
(0.0000)*** 
Adjusted R² 0.928513 0.763565 0.835235 0.568162 0.810120 0.809761 
F-Value 83.26148 
(0.000000) 
62.36043 
(0.000000) 
97.31568 
(0.0000) 
25.99800 
(0.0000) 
82.06336 
(0.0000) 
76.61763 
(0.0000) 
Method GLS Weighted 
Probability are in bracket - P statistically significant at 1% :(***); at 5% (**) ; at 10%  (*) 
 
The non accession pool mostly composed of Balkan countries presents some 
interesting features (Table 3). COMPET alone (Eq. 2) is significant and 
positively connected to FDI but in Equation (1) it is no longer significant. CPI 
in both cases is a relevant determinant as EHE and ER. GOV is significant in 
Equation (6) but not in (1) and has never the expected sign. At this stage of the 
transitional process, non accession countries are missing of attractiveness and 
are lacking of efficient institutional regulations. FDI are privatization-led and 
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the sectors concerned by privatization (finance, transportation, energy, 
telecommunication, water) are belonging to oligopolistic markets structures. 
Moreover, CPI is highly important and significant as ER and EHE has a 
negative sign. Non accession countries are seen by foreign investors as lacking 
of credibility. In such a difficult business environment, inward-FDI are mostly 
led by cost seeking strategies than by local market opportunities searches 
(privatization). 
 
Table 3: GLS estimations for the Non Accession Pool  
Non accession Pool (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia & Montenegro and 
TFYR Macedonia) – 56 observations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -2.343454 
(0.3545) 
-2.151597 
(0.0471) 
-1.840049 
(0.0490) 
0.245537 
(0.7932) 
-2.485482 
(0.0209) 
2.783510 
(0.0530) 
Log GDP 0.573185 
(0.0002) 
0.621039 
(0.0001) 
0.489715 
(0.0013) 
0.672413 
(0.0000) 
0.526882 
(0.0003) 
0.385916 
(0.0116) 
COMPET 0.278306 
(0.3851) 
0.722925 
(0.0098) 
    
CPI 0.348148 
(0.0847) 
 0.818079 
(0.0000) 
   
EHE -0.150524 
(0.0008) 
  -0.189680 
(0.0000) 
  
ER 0.745354 
(0.1085) 
   1.136389 
(0.0007) 
 
GOV 0.087256 
(0.6893) 
    -0.452321 
(0.0024) 
Adjusted R² 0.722263 0.396569 0.869702 0.817758 0.475995 0.343380 
F-Value 24.83820 
(0.000000) 
19.07273 
(0.000001) 
184.5550 
(0.000000) 
124.3979 
(0.0000) 
25.98044 
(0.0000) 
15.38113 
(0.000005) 
Method GLS Weighted 
Probability are in bracket - P statistically significant at 1% :(***); at 5% (**) ; at 10%  (*) 
 
Foreign investors seem to be less influenced by institutions in accession 
countries than in non accession ones. We can wonder whether or not accession 
countries have more conventional FDI determinants, essentially demand and 
efficiency oriented, close to CEECs ones. This shift could emphasize the 
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progressive upgrading of these host countries’ institutional pattern thanks to 
their future EU anchorage. When the host countries appear to foreign investors 
insecure and risky, often at the beginning of the transition process, Institutions 
seem to be of a major importance (Hunya 2002; Demekas & al., 2005). Their 
pattern may attract or deter FDI. 
 
Figure 3: FDI determinants in SEECs 
Bulgaria
Croatia
Romania
FDI sensibility to
the local Demand
FDI sensibility to
the Market
creating,
regulating and
stabilizing
Institutions
FDI sensibility to the
Market creating and
stabilizing
Institutions
Inward
FDI
The EU Acquis communautaires
requirements forced local
institutions to move tow ards more
transparency  and stability.
Foreign investors are confident in
the local institutional arrangement
but they  are still expecting some
improvements and transparency
to upgrade their FDIs in a more
value-added intensive production
based on a qualif ied labor.
Foreign investors have some
reluctance  to invest because the
local institutional set is not reliable,
credible and unstable.
Foreign investors adopt a cost
seeking strategy  based on short
term advantages and may not
develop more value-added
activities.  Inw ard FDI are
essentially privatization-led.
Accession Countries
Non accession countries
Albania,
Bosnia &
Herzegovinia,
Moldova,
Serbia &
Montenegro
and TFYR
Macedonia
Inward
FDI
FDI sensibility to
the local Demand
Institutional arrangements and inward-FDI:
a comparison between Accession and non Accession countries
(1992 - 2004)
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Conclusion 
The results of our empirical test appear to confirm our expectation that FDI is 
sensitive to specific and local institutional arrangements. Uncertain 
institutional environment impedes foreign investors to do business easily and 
efficiently.  
Inward FDI in accession countries are linked to demand and among 
institutions, market creating, regulating and stabilization institutions (ER, CPI, 
COMPET) are the most important FDI attractors. FDI are more sensitive to 
institutions in non candidate countries than in the future EU members. This 
differentiated sensibility to institutional arrangements should be explained by 
the EU Enlargement process and mainly the Acquis communautaire criterion. 
Before joining the EU, new members have to improve considerably their 
institutions in order to fulfil most of the EU requirements. Such an 
improvement created an institutional shift towards more stability and 
transparent rules. Non candidate countries are not yet concerned by these 
Acquis. Comparatively, their institutional arrangements may be seen by foreign 
investors as immature, unstable and less reliable.  
As far as non accession countries are concerned, the role of informal 
institutions in attracting FDI should be explored. In these countries, the 
socialist legacy and its corresponding form of social capital survive in informal 
institutions and generate a prosperous basement for irregular practices 
(corruption, black markets, high paid union workers …). Moreover, these 
countries have deep cultural and ethnical specifications that create conditions 
for a strong informal Institutional pattern which necessary influences the 
formal Institutions building. Except the fact that these countries are spitted up, 
this situation does not develop favourable conditions for change and generates 
a large socialist past dependence process. The allocation of resources devoted 
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to reforms and new policies setting should primarily deal with this particular 
situation. In our opinion, these underestimated factors explain the foreign 
investor’s reluctance to invest once the privatization process is over. The shift 
from privatization-led FDI to efficiency-seeking FDI is the most important 
challenge these countries must face since war to avoid a banishment on the 
borders of Europe. 
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